(The Center Square) - The City of Los Angeles’s “mansion tax” on all property over $5.15 million has led to an over 70% decrease in affected sales, resulting in significant foregone property tax revenue, according to a research preview of county assessor data from Commonwealth Title. Mott Smith, a real estate development professor at the Sol Price School of Public Policy at the University of Southern California, analyzed the effect of Measure ULA, a voter-approved tax that was marketed as a “mansion” tax to fund social services, but applies to all real estate — including offices, industrial space, shopping centers, and multifamily buildings. Smith found affected sales dropped by over 70% since April of 2023, when the measure took effect, with a worse decline for multifamily, commercial, and industrial space, while sales increased in the rest of the county and continued as normal for properties under the threshold. Smith says the impact of reduced sales means less tax revenue now and in the long term, which could require the city and county to scale back essential services, as growing deficits leave the state without the ability to provide any bailouts. “Everything from schools to police and fire to other social services are funded primarily through property tax receipts,” said Smith in an interview with The Center Square. “What Measure ULA appears to be doing is reducing property tax growth in Los Angeles County because of a bad policy in Los Angeles City at a time of probably the greatest fiscal strain we’ve seen in maybe eight to ten years.” Los Angeles City Controller Kenneth Mejia recently announced the city is “ broke ” and borrowing $80 million to cover court-ordered liability payments, suggesting the city can’t afford to lose money now. In California, property taxes are assessed at the value of the purchase price, with increases on assessed value capped at 2% per year, meaning a building purchased for $50,000 in 1980 is still taxed at $137,000, even though it may be worth over $1 million today. Because property sales reset the assessed value of the property back to the current market rate, resulting in higher property tax revenue, a slowdown in sales cuts into current revenue from the loss of non-ULA transfer taxes of 0.56% at the city and county levels, and future revenue increases from the resets. Property taxes fund most of the local government services people use, meaning lower property tax revenue can leave municipalities scrambling for funding. In Oakland , for example, half of the city’s $80 million shortfall is due to lower than expected revenue from the city’s real estate transfer tax. Smith also warned that because most buyers tend to buy property to redevelop it, a slowdown in buying means people don’t want to invest in Los Angeles. “This is a very concerning leading indicator that builders have left the LA market,” said Smith. “All the zoning in the world isn’t going to help if the builders have left.” As an illustrative example, Smith noted if a development company bought a warehouse for $4 million, invested $500,000 in renovations, and sold it for $5.5 million, the developer would get a ULA tax bill of $220,000 — or half of the pretax profit. If investors covered 80% of the cost for 80% of the profit, the developer would be left with $56,000 in pretax profit, before paying employees. For many developers, this means investing in LA just isn’t worth it.Congress has always favoured power over Constitution: Rajnath during Lok Sabha debate80jili telegram 。

FBI Director Wray says he intends to resign before Trump takes office in January

Meta, Amazon, tech CEOs sending big bucks for Trump's inaugurationA number of Western officials and security agencies have recently warned of the growing challenges posed by Russian hybrid warfare . This threat is not new, of course. The Kremlin has long been engaged in acts of hybrid aggression against the West, with information warfare playing a central role in Moscow’s efforts to destabilize its democratic adversaries. With geopolitical tension now rising amid a jockeying for position ahead of anticipated Ukraine peace talks in early 2025, Russian information attacks look set to intensify. It is important to acknowledge that Russian information warfare is highly innovative and continues to evolve at a rapid pace. Russia’s information offensives initially focused on the Kremlin’s own media platforms such as RT and Sputnik , but these outlets have proven relatively easy to identify, discredit, and restrict. In recent years, Russia has increasingly sought to promote its narratives via partners and proxies, as the recent scandal involving prominent US podcasters highlighted. The pioneering use of social media troll farms to fuel divisions and distort public opinion remains a major component of Russian information warfare. In addition, the Kremlin engages in the large-scale creation of fake websites mimicking prominent news outlets, adding a veneer of credibility to Russian disinformation. Russian narratives are also evolving. In 2022, the Kremlin’s attempts to depict Ukraine as a Nazi state largely failed to connect with international audiences, who struggled to understand how a country with a popularly elected Jewish president and no far-right presence in government could be in need of “de-Nazification.” Instead, Moscow has turned its attention to promoting the decline of the West and the need for a new multipolar world order. Through a wide variety of traditional and digital media initiatives, the Kremlin has sought to highlight economic problems in Europe and North America, while pushing the idea of growing Western public dissatisfaction over issues such as identity politics and minority rights. Meanwhile, Russia positions itself as a bastion of traditional family values, social stability, and conservatism. This has struck a chord with alienated segments of society throughout the West. As the world watches the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfold, UkraineAlert delivers the best Atlantic Council expert insight and analysis on Ukraine twice a week directly to your inbox. The Global South is currently a priority front in Russia’s information war. With the invasion of Ukraine leaving Russia isolated from the West, the Kremlin has reoriented its foreign policy toward the non-Western world. In its messaging to audiences across the Global South, Russia plays on historical resentment at centuries of Western colonialism and portrays itself as a fellow victim of the West. Despite Russia’s long history of imperial aggression and openly imperialistic ambitions in Ukraine, Putin has sought to win over audiences in Africa, Asia, and South America by posing as a defender against Western imperialism. It would be foolish to dismiss Russia’s anti-imperial messaging as absurd. Older generations across the Global South are often aware of the role played by the Soviet Union in the decolonization movement that followed World War II. Others have little knowledge of the imperial ambitions underpinning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and tend base their opinions on Putin primarily on his opposition to the West. This is helping to shape the geopolitical outlook throughout the Global South and is creating a range of foreign policy challenges for the West that expand far beyond the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Another key element of the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign is the claim that NATO enlargement represents a direct security threat to the Russian Federation and is the real cause of the war in Ukraine. This argument resonates loudly with international audiences suspicious of the West’s dominant role in world affairs. While other Russian attempts to justify the invasion of Ukraine have fallen flat, attempts to blame NATO have proved highly effective. In reality, Putin seems well aware that NATO doesn’t pose a threat to Russia. Tellingly, he raised no serious objections in 2022 when neighboring Finland and Sweden announced their intention to join the alliance, despite the fact that this would more than double Russia’s NATO borders and transform the strategically crucial Baltic Sea into a NATO lake. Indeed, he has since withdrawn most Russian troops from the country’s Finnish frontier. Evidently, Putin’s expansionist foreign policy reflects his opposition to Ukrainian independence rather than any artificial fears over NATO expansion. Putin’s NATO narrative may not stand up to scrutiny, but it is likely to play an important role in any upcoming peace talks, with Russia currently pushing for an end to NATO enlargement and a firm commitment to permanent Ukrainian neutrality. This would be potentially disastrous for international security. A neutral Ukraine would be highly vulnerable to further Russian aggression and eventual occupation. Meanwhile, rising anti-NATO sentiment in the US and elsewhere risks undermining transatlantic cooperation and fostering isolationism. The West must trend carefully when attempting to confront Russian disinformation. Crucially, any efforts to moderate content on social media or impose restrictions on even the most openly propagandistic of platforms invites accusations of censorship. With this in mind, Western governments must walk a fine line as they seek to protect themselves against the Kremlin’s information warfare while safeguarding freedom of expression. Given the transnational nature of the modern information landscape, international cooperation is essential when attempting to combat Russian disinformation. Looking ahead, the Western response should include the creation of collaborative task forces, real-time intelligence sharing, and coordinated efforts to sanction state and private actors. Western policymakers must also match the Kremlin in terms of versatility and innovation if they wish to keep their countries safe in an increasingly complex and interconnected information environment. Putin’s Russia has demonstrated the importance of the information front in modern warfare. It is time for the West to catch up. Kateryna Odarchenko is a partner at SIC Group Ukraine. Elena Davlikanova is a fellow at CEPA. Further reading The views expressed in UkraineAlert are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Atlantic Council, its staff, or its supporters.

Jonah Goldberg Among elites across the ideological spectrum, there's one point of unifying agreement: Americans are bitterly divided. What if that's wrong? What if elites are the ones who are bitterly divided while most Americans are fairly unified? History rarely lines up perfectly with the calendar (the "sixties" didn't really start until the decade was almost over). But politically, the 21st century neatly began in 2000, when the election ended in a tie and the color coding of electoral maps became enshrined as a kind of permanent tribal color war of "red vs. blue." Elite understanding of politics has been stuck in this framework ever since. Politicians and voters have leaned into this alleged political reality, making it seem all the more real in the process. I loathe the phrase "perception is reality," but in politics it has the reifying power of self-fulfilling prophecy. Like rival noble families in medieval Europe, elites have been vying for power and dominance on the arrogant assumption that their subjects share their concern for who rules rather than what the rulers can deliver. Political cartoonists from across country draw up something special for the holiday In 2018, the group More in Common published a massive report on the "hidden tribes" of American politics. The wealthiest and whitest groups were "devoted conservatives" (6%) and "progressive activists" (8%). These tribes dominate the media, the parties and higher education, and they dictate the competing narratives of red vs. blue, particularly on cable news and social media. Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of Americans resided in, or were adjacent to, the "exhausted majority." These people, however, "have no narrative," as David Brooks wrote at the time. "They have no coherent philosophic worldview to organize their thinking and compel action." Lacking a narrative might seem like a very postmodern problem, but in a postmodern elite culture, postmodern problems are real problems. It's worth noting that red vs. blue America didn't emerge ex nihilo. The 1990s were a time when the economy and government seemed to be working, at home and abroad. As a result, elites leaned into the narcissism of small differences to gain political and cultural advantage. They remain obsessed with competing, often apocalyptic, narratives. That leaves out most Americans. The gladiatorial combatants of cable news, editorial pages and academia, and their superfan spectators, can afford these fights. Members of the exhausted majority are more interested in mere competence. I think that's the hidden unity elites are missing. This is why we keep throwing incumbent parties out of power: They get elected promising competence but get derailed -- or seduced -- by fan service to, or trolling of, the elites who dominate the national conversation. There's a difference between competence and expertise. One of the most profound political changes in recent years has been the separation of notions of credentialed expertise from real-world competence. This isn't a new theme in American life, but the pandemic and the lurch toward identity politics amplified distrust of experts in unprecedented ways. This is a particular problem for the left because it is far more invested in credentialism than the right. Indeed, some progressives are suddenly realizing they invested too much in the authority of experts and too little in the ability of experts to provide what people want from government, such as affordable housing, decent education and low crime. The New York Times' Ezra Klein says he's tired of defending the authority of government institutions. Rather, "I want them to work." One of the reasons progressives find Trump so offensive is his absolute inability to speak the language of expertise -- which is full of coded elite shibboleths. But Trump veritably shouts the language of competence. I don't mean he is actually competent at governing. But he is effectively blunt about calling leaders, experts and elites -- of both parties -- stupid, ineffective, weak and incompetent. He lost in 2020 because voters didn't believe he was actually good at governing. He won in 2024 because the exhausted majority concluded the Biden administration was bad at it. Nostalgia for the low-inflation pre-pandemic economy was enough to convince voters that Trumpian drama is the tolerable price to pay for a good economy. About 3 out of 4 Americans who experienced "severe hardship" because of inflation voted for Trump. The genius of Trump's most effective ad -- "Kamala is for they/them, President Trump is for you" -- was that it was simultaneously culture-war red meat and an argument that Harris was more concerned about boutique elite concerns than everyday ones. If Trump can actually deliver competent government, he could make the Republican Party the majority party for a generation. For myriad reasons, that's an if so big it's visible from space. But the opportunity is there -- and has been there all along. Goldberg is editor-in-chief of The Dispatch: thedispatch.com . Respond: Write a letter to the editor | Write a guest opinion Subscribe to stay connected to Tucson. A subscription helps you access more of the local stories that keep you connected to the community. Catch the latest in Opinion Get opinion pieces, letters and editorials sent directly to your inbox weekly!